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QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether Section 1806(f) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et
seq., displaces the state-secrets privilege and authorizes a district court to resolve, in camera and ex parte,
the merits of a lawsuit challenging the lawfulness of
government surveillance by considering the privileged
evidence.
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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
Laura K. Donohue is a Professor of Law at
Georgetown Law and Director of Georgetown’s Center
on National Security and the Law. She holds her
Ph.D. in History from the University of Cambridge,
and her J.D. with Distinction from Stanford University. She has written extensively on national security,
foreign intelligence, constitutional law, legal history,
political theory, and public law. Professor Donohue’s
scholarship includes notable writings on the state-secrets privilege. She has served on the Board of the
American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on
Law and National Security and is a Senior Scholar at
Georgetown Law’s Center for the Constitution. In
2015, the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
appointed her as one of five amici curiae under the
USA FREEDOM Act.
Professor Donohue has a substantial interest in
this case because it presents important questions
about the proper application of the state-secrets privilege.*
INTRODUCTION
Amicus submits this brief in support of neither
party to provide the Court with background on the origins and evolution of the state-secrets privilege. The
English and American cases decided before United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), as well as the
decisions before and after the enactment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA),
The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No
counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part. No
person or entity other than amicus curiae or her counsel made a
monetary contribution to the brief’s preparation or submission.
*
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produce several observations that may help the Court
to resolve this case.
First, both Reynolds and earlier English and
American caselaw treat state secrets as an evidentiary privilege rather than a substantive rule of
decision. As with other privileges, upholding an assertion of state secrets means that the case should
continue, if possible, without the privileged information. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876), in
contrast, states a different rule of narrow applicability
resting on the secrecy inherent in certain government
contracts, as the Court made clear in General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 563 U.S. 478, 485, 490
(2011), and Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2005).
Second, although the judiciary affords the executive branch deference in asserting state secrets, courts
consistently acknowledge their own, critical role in ensuring that those invocations of privilege are justified.
Third, courts strive to find ways to avoid dismissing cases whenever possible. Often that means using
in camera procedures to evaluate a defense, as in
then-Judge Scalia’s opinion in Molerio v. FBI, 749
F.2d 815, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Fourth, although dismissal based on the state-secrets evidentiary privilege finds no support in early
English or U.S. cases before FISA (outside of the inapposite Totten line), a few post-FISA decisions have
dismissed lawsuits regardless of their merits on the
grounds that further litigation presents too great a
risk of exposing state secrets. Those decisions underscore how rare that severe result should be. And they
are confined primarily to circumstances in which state
secrets are central, such as extraordinary rendition or
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defamation, where the truth or falsity of statements
about classified information is the core issue.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A. English cases around the Founding do not
support dismissing an action based on the state-secrets privilege. Those decisions involved the exclusion
of evidence based on a proper invocation of the privilege, rather than any rule of dismissal. Suits simply
continued without the excluded material.
B. Nearly every pre-Reynolds U.S. decision is of
the same ilk, applying state-secrets as an evidentiary
privilege rather than a dismissal remedy. Totten is the
exception. There, the entire premise of the suit—a
contract binding parties to silence—was a state secret.
The pre-Reynolds caselaw thus likewise fails to support dismissal based on the state-secrets privilege.
C. Following Reynolds and before FISA’s enactment, courts did not dismiss actions based on the
state-secrets privilege. Instead, they continued to
view the state-secrets doctrine as an evidentiary privilege carrying the same consequences as any other
privilege. Courts also emphasized their critical role in
exercising their Article III powers to ensure that the
executive branch properly invoked the privilege.
When contemplated, dismissal was to be avoided
wherever possible by using in camera procedures.
D. Since FISA, courts have continued to treat the
state-secrets doctrine primarily as an evidentiary
privilege. Many decisions have refused to dismiss lawsuits based on the privilege, while others center only
on the evidentiary question, whatever its ultimate
consequences. Some decisions have found dismissal
warranted, but only because the plaintiff could not
make out a prima facie case without the excluded
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evidence. Still other decisions have considered the
government’s submissions in camera on the merits to
conclude that they establish a valid defense. A handful of recent lower-court decisions, in contrast, have
dismissed suits without apparent inspection of the
merits of the claims, and even where the plaintiff
could make out a prima facie case, on the grounds that
no amount of procedural care could safeguard state secrets. It is questionable whether those cases are
consistent with this Court’s discussion of the separate
Totten and Reynolds doctrines in General Dynamics
and whether they adequately considered the possibility of in camera review, especially given the
importance of the constitutional questions presented.
ARGUMENT
A. English state-secrets cases involved only
exclusion of certain evidence and not the
assertion of a bar to continued litigation.
The Court in Reynolds recognized that while
“[j]udicial experience with the privilege which protects
military and state secrets [was] limited” in the United
States, “English experience” had been “more extensive, but still relatively slight compared with other
evidentiary privileges.” 345 U.S. at 7; see id. at 7 n.15.
The English decisions show that the common law
treated state secrets purely as a matter of exclusion of
evidence rather than any bar to presenting a defense
or continuing a suit.
The paucity of English caselaw noted in Reynolds
reflected two factors. First, royal prerogative prevented nonconsensual suits against the Crown as a
concomitant of sovereignty, the king’s inability to do
wrong, and the monarch’s role as the “fountain of justice.” See 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *241-49, 266.
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Claims against the Crown therefore could proceed, if
at all, on a Petition of Right. ROBERT DORSEY WATKINS, STATE AS A PARTY LITIGANT 14-31 (1927); see also
Deare v. Attorney-General (1835) 1 Younge & Collyer
197, 208-09. But sovereign immunity did not extend
to government officers’ tortious acts, such as those famously at issue in Money v. Leach (1765) 3 Burr. 1742
(KB), and Entick v. Carrington (1765) 2 Wilson 275
(KB), so state-secrets issues could arise in such contexts. Second, the establishment of the nisi prius
reports 1790-1830 significantly increased the number
and availability of cases on evidence. See John H. Wigmore, A General Survey of the History and Rules of
Evidence, in 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 691, 694-97 (1908). Decisions from this
period synthesize the English common-law approach
to state secrets around the time of the Founding.
The seminal ruling in Rex v. Watson (1817) 2
Stark. 116, 148-49 (KB), for instance, held that a criminal defendant could not elicit testimony describing
whether a plan of the Tower of London “found at [his]
lodgings” “was a correct plan.” The court explained
that “allow[ing] an officer of the tower to be examined
as to the accuracy of such a plan” might cause “public
mischief.” Id. Yet the court permitted testimony that
the plan “was a plan of a part of the interior of the
Tower,” and one justice said the witness could testify
“that prints containing a plan of the Tower might be
purchased,” even though defense counsel “could not
ask the officer whether they were accurate.” Id.
Home v. Bentinck (1820) 2 Brod. & B. 130, likewise
involved an evidentiary ruling resulting in the narrow
exclusion of certain evidence. In a libel trial, the court
affirmed the exclusion of minutes from a military
court of enquiry initiated at the direction of “the
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commander-in-chief.” Id. at 162. The court reasoned
that “on the broad rule of public policy and convenience, … these matters, secret in their natures, and
involving delicate enquiry and the names of persons,
stand protected.” Id. at 163.
The court in Home looked to Wyatt v. Gore (1816)
Holt N.P.C. 299, which similarly excluded sensitive
evidence. In a libel action against the Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada by the territory’s surveyorgeneral, the court directed “the attorney-general of
the province” not to testify about “the nature of some
communications made to him” by the Lieutenant Governor about the surveyor-general’s conduct. Id. at 30001. Those conversations “ought not be disclosed” because when “[t]he governor consults with a high legal
officer on the state of his colony; what passes between
them is confidential: no office of this kind could be executed with safety, if conversations between the
governor of a distant province and his attorney-general, who is the only person upon whom such governor
can lean for advice, were suffered to be disclosed.” Id.
at 302. Despite the exclusion of that evidence, the
plaintiff ultimately prevailed, securing “£300 on the
count for a libel.” Id. at 305.
Cooke v. Maxwell (1817) 2 Stark. 183, 183, 185-86,
followed course: The court agreed that instructions
from the governor of the British colony of Sierra Leone
to a military officer could not “on principles of public
policy be read in evidence.” Nevertheless, the case proceeded. Although the plaintiff could not prove “the
contents of the instrument,” he could prove “that what
was done was done by the order of the defendant.” Id.
at 186. The result was a “[v]erdict for the plaintiff.” Id.
at 187.
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Regina v. Russell (1839) 7 Dowl. Pr. 693, involved
similar principles. The court dismissed contempt proceedings arising from the defendants’ failure to
produce papers subpoenaed at an earlier trial. Id. at
695. The court explained that the papers would have
been inadmissible anyway because they “were of a
public nature, and in the possession of Lord John Russell in his public character as Secretary of State.” Id.
Finally, H.M.S. Bellerophon (1875) 44 LJR 5, 6-7,
involved both an invocation of privilege and a decision
on the merits. The court refused to allow owners of the
Flamsteed, a ship damaged in a collision with the navy
ship Bellerophon, to inspect the Bellerophon’s log
books or government communications about the collision. “[T]he question, whether the production of the
document would be injurious to the public service,
must be determined, not by the Judge, but by the head
of the department having the custody of the paper.”
Id. at 7. Despite that evidentiary ruling, the case progressed “on the merits.” Id. The court ultimately ruled
against the plaintiffs because “this collision was
caused by the Flamsteed not porting in due time, but
waiting to port until she came too near to the starboard side of the Bellerophon.” Id. at 9.
Prominent nineteenth century English treatise
writers likewise considered state secrets to be an evidentiary privilege akin to any other. Taylor’s treatise,
for example, listed “[s]tate secrets” among “[t]he matters which the law says shall not be the subject of
evidence in a Court of Justice,” alongside marital and
attorney-client communications, certain information
related to judicial proceedings, and “matters of which
decency forbids the disclosure.” 1 JOHN PITT TAYLOR,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AS
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ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND § 909, at 589
(G. Pitt-Lewis ed., 9th ed. 1895) (emphasis omitted).
B. Early U.S. cases typically involved only
the exclusion of evidence and its
consequences.
Starting with the trial of Aaron Burr in 1807 and
continuing through the Court’s decision in Reynolds,
early U.S. decisions involved the exclusion of evidence, not dismissal of the litigation. Totten is the
single exception that proves the rule, and even Totten
fits within the concept that dismissal may be a consequence of an evidentiary privilege rather than a
substantive remedy.
1. Many early U.S. decisions, including
Reynolds, involved only exclusion of
evidence.
The role of the state-secrets privilege in U.S. jurisprudence traces back at least to Chief Justice
Marshall’s decision, while riding circuit, during Aaron
Burr’s historic treason and misdemeanor prosecution,
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (1807). Marshall
allowed the defense to subpoena President Jefferson
for a letter he received from alleged coconspirator
General James Wilkinson, governor of the Louisiana
Territory. Id. at 190-91; see Robert M. Chesney, State
Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation,
75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1249, 1272 (2007). While the
President is “subject to the general rules which apply
to others,” Marshall observed, where he has “sufficient motives for declining to produce a particular
paper,” “those motives may be such as to restrain the
court from enforcing its production.” Burr, 25 F. Cas.
at 191. Without attempting to anticipate the President’s response, the Chief Justice reasoned that he
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could not “precisely lay down any general rule for such
a case” and that “[t]he propriety of withholding [a paper] must be decided by [the president] himself, not by
another for him.” Id. at 192.
For many years following Burr, courts understood
the state-secrets privilege to present an evidentiary
issue. In Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel
Co., 199 F. 353, 353-56 (E.D. Pa. 1912), for instance,
the court ordered expunged from the record drawings
relating to armor-piercing projectiles. The court explained that the Secretary of the Navy had asserted
“that the drawings embodied military secrets … that
could not be disclosed without detriment to the public
interests.” Id. at 354.
In Pollen v. United States, 85 Ct. Cl. 673 (1937), a
patent dispute, the Court of Claims similarly determined that the state-secrets privilege barred certain
testimony. But the court underscored that it was
merely “passing upon a rule of evidence as it pertains
to two certain witnesses” and was “not refusing and
does not refuse to permit the petitioners to establish
their case.” Id. at 680.
In Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp. 583,
583 (E.D.N.Y. 1939), the court refused to order Ford
“to produce and permit plaintiffs to inspect drawings
showing the construction of range keepers or other apparatus for determining sighting data for guns.” The
government had intervened to assert “that the subject
matter of the suit involves a military secret and that
any disclosure of the structures used by the Navy or
others authorized by it would be detrimental to the
national defense and the public interests.” Id. at 584.
Reynolds fits the same pattern. The plaintiffs
brought a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) suit after
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their husbands died in a B-29 crash, and the government invoked the military-secrets privilege in
response to their request for an official accident report
and statements of surviving crewmembers. 345 U.S.
at 2-4. Issuing only an evidentiary ruling upholding
the privilege, this Court remanded the case. The
Court emphasized that there was “nothing to suggest
that the electronic equipment … had any causal connection with the accident,” such that the plaintiffs
should be able “to adduce the essential facts as to causation without resort to material touching upon
military secrets.” Id. at 11.
2. Totten involved dismissal premised
on a secret government contract.
The sole exception to this pattern of treating statesecrets privilege exclusively as an evidentiary issue is
Totten. In Totten, “the very subject matter of the action, a contract to perform espionage, was a matter of
state secret,” so “[t]he action was dismissed on the
pleadings without ever reaching the question of evidence.” Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 n.26.
Totten was a Court of Claims action seeking recovery under an alleged contract with President Lincoln
to spy on the Confederacy. 92 U.S. at 105-06. This
Court gave two reasons for affirming the dismissal of
the suit. First, the contract itself stipulated “a secret
service”—“[b]oth employer and agent must have understood that the lips of the other were to be for ever
sealed respecting the relation of either to the matter.”
Id. at 106. Not only might the “publicity produced by
an action” endanger national security, but it “would
itself be a breach of a contract” that would “defeat a
recovery.” Id. at 107. Second, the Court went on to
state “a general principle, that public policy forbids
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the maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the
trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure
of mater which the law itself regards as confidential,”
just as a suit between spouses or client and counsel
“cannot be maintained.” Id.
Totten is no ordinary evidentiary-privilege case.
As the Court explained in General Dynamics, Totten
represents a narrow line of precedent resting on the
Court’s “common-law authority to fashion contractual
remedies in Government-contracting disputes.” 563
U.S. at 485; see also Tenet, 544 U.S. at 3 (Totten “prohibit[s] suits against the Government based on covert
espionage agreements”). The Court’s “refusal to enforce th[e] contract” in General Dynamics “captures,”
just as in Totten, “what the ex ante expectations of the
parties were or reasonably ought to have been”—i.e.,
“that state secrets would prevent courts from resolving many possible disputes under the … agreement.”
563 U.S. at 490 (citing Totten, 92 U.S. at 106).
3. In some criminal cases, exclusion of
privileged evidence either required
the case to proceed without the
evidence or forced the government to
cease prosecution.
The government also invoked the state-secrets
privilege in some early criminal cases. Those decisions
left the government with a choice: proceed without the
privileged evidence, or dismiss the prosecution. “[I]n
the criminal field, … the Government can invoke its
evidentiary privileges only at the price of letting the
defendant go free.” Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 12 & n.27;
accord Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 670-72
(1957); United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 79-80 (2d
Cir. 2008).
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United States v. Haugen, 58 F. Supp. 436 (E.D.
Wash. 1944), provides a good example of the choice
put to the government. In a prosecution for fraud relating to a government contract, the Army refused to
disclose information about the contract because it
deemed secrecy “necessary to national defense.” Id. at
438. When the government subsequently “failed to
present the best [alternative] evidence available,” the
court dismissed the prosecution for failure to meet the
burden of proof. Id. at 440.
C. Decisions between Reynolds and the
enactment of FISA in 1978 did not
dismiss actions based on the statesecrets privilege.
Outside of the Totten line, Amicus is unaware of
any decisions between this Court’s 1953 decision in
Reynolds and the 1978 enactment of FISA upholding
dismissal of an action based on the state-secrets privilege. A number of decisions, moreover, emphasize the
judiciary’s important role in determining whether the
government properly has invoked the privilege. Still
other decisions recognize that dismissal is a drastic
remedy and attempt to avoid it.
1. Outside of the Totten line, decisions
between Reynolds and the enactment
of FISA did not dismiss actions based
on the state-secrets privilege.
Following Reynolds, courts continued to treat the
state-secrets doctrine as an evidentiary privilege, permitting litigation to proceed where sufficient
unprivileged evidence remained.
In Republic of China v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 142 F. Supp. 551, 552,
556-57 (D. Md. 1956), for example, the court upheld
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the United States’ assertion of state-secrets privilege
while permitting it to continue seeking recovery on
marine and war-risk insurance policies. Although the
government provided “full discovery of all commercialtype information in [its] files,” it withheld information
regarding certain communications with the British
government. Id. at 556. The court held that the government’s refusal “to supply th[at] information” did
not “bar its recovery.” Id. at 557. The insurers “knew,
or should have known, that where military secrets and
similar matters are at stake, certain information is
privileged.” Id. at 556.
In Heine v. Raus, 399 F.2d 785, 788 (4th Cir.
1968), a defamation case, the Fourth Circuit upheld
rulings permitting the defendant, a CIA agent, not to
answer questions that would encroach on the CIA Director’s assertion of state-secrets privilege. The
Fourth Circuit noted that the district court “made sufficient inquiry—some of it in camera—to assure that”
the privilege had been “properly invoked,” and, further, that the district court “requir[ed] [the agent] to
answer those [questions] which the Court thought
would not impair the privilege while foreclosing answers to those questions which apparently would.” Id.
The Fourth Circuit found the district judge’s balancing approach “faithful to the ‘formula of compromise’
taught by Reynolds” and vacated the summary judgment ruling against the plaintiff so that the district
court could determine the case on the merits, if possible. Id. at 788-91.
Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. 475 (E.D. Mich. 1977),
is illustrative too. The plaintiff alleged that federal defendants “conducted an intensive investigation of his
daily activities since 1967 in a manner that [had] interfered with his freedom of speech and association,
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his right of privacy, and his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Id. at 478.
Although the court upheld the state-secrets privilege
as to a number of discovery requests, id. at 479, 48290, it cautioned that its inquiry “ha[d] not ended” because it still needed to “determine[] whether the
warrantless electronic surveillances in this case comply with the commands of the Fourth Amendment.”
Id. at 489. And throughout, the court took great care
to disentangle material subject to privilege from “matters not clearly within its scope.” Id. at 492-93. For
instance, given a publicly available congressional report, “it would be a farce to conclude that the name of
[a particular] federal agency remains a military or
state secret.” Id. at 493. The plaintiff had “a right to
know the name of the federal agencies that have admittedly engaged in the warrantless surveillances of
his personal communications and affairs.” Id.
2. Courts emphasized the judiciary’s
important role in assessing the
invocation of privilege.
In Reynolds, the Court observed that the state-secrets privilege “is not to be lightly invoked” or
“accepted,” and that a court must “satisfy[] itself that
the occasion for invoking the privilege is appropriate.”
345 U.S. at 7, 11. Lower courts subsequently emphasized that “[t]o some degree at least, the validity of the
government’s assertion must be judicially assessed.”
Molerio, 749 F.2d at 822. They explained that “[i]t is
the courts, and not the executive officer claiming the
privilege, who must determine whether the claim is
based on valid concerns”—i.e., “whether the privilege
was claimed under circumstances indicating a reasonable possibility that military or state secrets would be
revealed.” Jabara, 75 F.R.D. at 484.
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To be sure, this Court noted in Reynolds that
courts “should not jeopardize the security which the
privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in
chambers.” 345 U.S. at 10. But in fidelity to this
Court’s exhortation that “[j]udicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of
executive officers,” id. at 9-10, courts often held the
government “obligated to submit the information or
records to the Court for its determination as to
whether the claim of privilege is well founded,” Snyder
v. United States, 20 F.R.D. 7, 9 (E.D.N.Y. 1956); see,
e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp.—Rsch. & Dev. Ctr. v.
Brown, 443 F. Supp. 1225, 1231-32 (E.D. Va. 1977).
That judicial check is especially important. As one
judge observed of Reynolds, “it became apparent years
later, after the claimed state secrets document was declassified, that it did not reveal the claimed state
secrets.” Mohamed v. Holder, No. 11-cv-50, 2014 WL
11516537, at *2 n.1 (E.D. Va. Sept. 15, 2014). As
Judge Skelly Wright noted, “it is public disclosure
which is to be avoided; of necessity, in camera judicial
inspection will often be imperative if a judge is to fulfill his own constitutional obligations.” Zweibon v.
Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 625 n.80 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en
banc) (plurality). Accordingly, courts examined materials to separate information subject to privilege from
information not “within its scope.” Jabara, 75 F.R.D.
at 492.
Courts also stressed that the privilege may turn
on timing. In United States v. Ahmad, 499 F.2d 851,
855 (3d Cir. 1974), the court explained that “[t]he passage of time has a profound effect upon such matters,
and that which is of utmost sensitivity one day may
fade into nothing more than interesting history within
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weeks or months.” Thus, the invocation of national security “must be viewed in the light of circumstances
as they exist at the time the request for disclosure is
made not when the affidavit was prepared or the material filed with the court.” Id.; accord Jabara, 75
F.R.D. at 488.
3. Courts undertook significant steps to
avoid dismissal based on the
assertion of state-secrets privilege.
Recognizing the severity of dismissal, courts attempted whenever possible to avoid it.
Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.
1958), proves illustrative. There, the Second Circuit
reversed the dismissal of an Invention Secrecy Act
suit seeking recovery for the United States’ alleged
use of the plaintiff’s patented invention, on which the
government had placed a secrecy order. The court remanded for a possible trial in camera with “a court
reporter and other essential court personnel with the
necessary security clearance.” Id. at 43. The court reasoned that “the privilege relating to state secrets is
inapplicable when disclosure to court personnel in an
in camera proceeding will not make the information
public or endanger the national security.” Id. at 44.
4. Dismissal decisions rested on Totten’s
government-contracting rule rather
than Reynolds’ evidentiary-privilege
rule.
As noted, this Court’s decision in Totten states a
special rule for secret government contracts. After
Reynolds, Totten continued to determine the outcome
in several cases. See, e.g., Tucker v. United States, 118
F. Supp. 371 (Ct. Cl. 1954). As courts recognized, however, those cases are “inapposite” in the evidentiary-
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privilege context because they “were contract actions
which the Court of Claims held could not be maintained because the contracts contained covenants of
secrecy as in Totten.” Spock v. United States, 464
F. Supp. 510, 520 & n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
D. Since FISA’s enactment in 1978, courts
have consistently recognized limits to
the state-secrets doctrine, only rarely
finding dismissal warranted.
After FISA’s enactment, courts continued to refuse to dismiss cases where the plaintiff could make
out a prima facie case without the privileged evidence.
Courts generally reserved dismissal for the plaintiff’s
failure to make out a prima facie case or the defendant’s showing in camera of a meritorious defense. A
few dismissals in recent years have rested on a different rationale: the centrality of state secrets to the
litigation. But courts have had little opportunity to
grapple with whether that approach is consistent with
the historical role of the evidentiary privilege or General Dynamics’ distinction between the Totten and
Reynolds lines.
1. Courts often refuse to dismiss cases
based on the state-secrets privilege.
In many instances, courts have refused to dismiss
suits based on the state-secrets privilege.
In Clift v. United States, 597 F.2d 826, 827 (2d Cir.
1979), Judge Friendly explained that although the
state-secrets privilege barred some discovery, the district court had “acted too precipitately in dismissing
the complaint.” Eugene Clift had sued the government
for patent damages for using his “cryptographic device,” which was subject to a secrecy order. Id.
Although the Second Circuit deferred to the NSA
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Director’s assertion of military secrets, it distinguished Totten, on which the district court had relied
to dismiss the suit, as resting on “an implied agreement of both parties ‘that the lips of the other were to
be for ever sealed respecting the relation of either to
the matter.’” Id. at 830 (quoting Totten, 92 U.S. at
106). “Clift entered into no contract; it was the Government that imposed secrecy on his patent
application,” and he had “not conceded that without
the requested documents he would be unable to proceed.” Id. Judge Friendly emphasized that, in the
future, “improvements in the art or other developments might make it feasible for the Government to
produce some documents under some safeguards.” Id.
“In time the cryptographic systems now considered so
secret may be as obsolete as the giant computer that
broke the German code in World War II.” Id. The court
thus suggested that the district judge consider staying
the litigation. Id.
Similarly, the court in Spock rejected the government’s argument “that the defendants can neither
admit nor deny the allegations” of unlawfully intercepting the plaintiff’s communications “without
disclosing state secrets.” 464 F. Supp. at 512, 518-20.
The court reasoned that dismissal “goes beyond the
traditional remedies fashioned by the courts in order
to protect state secrets or other classified information.” Id. at 519. “[T]he states secrets privilege is
only an evidentiary privilege,” and the plaintiff had a
“constitutional right” of “access to the courts to redress violations of his constitutional and statutory
rights.” Id. Indeed, other courts had authorized trial
before a special master or the judge in camera. Id. (citing Loral Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 558 F.2d
1130 (2d Cir. 1977), and Halpern, 258 F.2d 36).
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Consequently, the court held, “foreclos[ing] the plaintiff at the pleading stage … would be unfair and not in
keeping with the basic constitutional tenets of this
country.” Id. at 520.
Courts also began to confront cases in which plaintiffs adduced “facts sufficient to establish a prima
facie case of violation of [their] constitutional rights”
but the government’s defense turned on privileged information. Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 65, 68-69
(D.C. Cir. 1983). Ellsberg offered a way to address this
“potential problem.” Id. at 68. The court first explained that “the privilege may not be used to shield
any material not strictly necessary to prevent injury
to national security; and, whenever possible, sensitive
information must be disentangled from nonsensitive
information to allow for the release of the latter.” Id.
at 57; see id. at 52 (government could not withhold officials’ identities). The court concluded that, given
allegations of unconstitutional wiretaps, the district
court could use “in camera procedures” to ascertain
“the nature of the defendants’ activities” for purposes
of a qualified immunity defense, even “without the aid
of arguments of counsel.” Id. at 69; see also Monarch
Assur. P.L.C. v. United States, 244 F.3d 1356, 1360,
1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Reaffirming this approach in In re Sealed Case,
494 F.3d 139, 141, 147-48 (D.C. Cir. 2007), the D.C.
Circuit reversed the dismissal of Fourth Amendment
claims after concluding that the plaintiff could establish a prima facie case that a federal agent was
eavesdropping on him even without privileged information. The court further reasoned that the complaint
could be dismissed only if an “appropriately tailored
in camera review of the privileged record” revealed a
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meritorious privileged defense “that would likely
cause a trier to reach an erroneous result.” Id. at 151.
2. Other decisions center only on the
evidentiary privilege, whatever the
ultimate consequences may be.
Numerous decisions since FISA’s enactment deal
solely with the state-secrets evidentiary privilege
without addressing the consequences of excluding evidence. The most immediate “result is simply that the
evidence is unavailable, as though a witness had died,
and the case will proceed accordingly, with no consequences save those resulting from the loss of the
evidence.” Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 145 (quoting Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 64).
A good example is Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395, 397 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
where the court sustained the government’s claims of
privilege as the suit proceeded. Northrop had sued
McDonnell Douglas over the companies’ work on what
became the F-18 jet, and McDonnell Douglas sought
to defend itself with documents it subpoenaed from
the government relating to the sale of military equipment to other countries. Id. at 397-98. Although the
D.C. Circuit upheld the order quashing the subpoena,
it observed that McDonnell Douglas’ defense was not
“impossible” without the desired documents, because
the company had already “obtained substantial discovery” from the government. Id. at 400 n.7.
Other decisions similarly recognize that “through
discovery plaintiffs may be able to gather unprivileged
information that, when combined with their other evidence, is sufficient to establish a prima facie case.”
Monarch Assurance P.L.C. v. United States, 36 Fed.
Cl. 324, 329 (1996). And many others reflect only
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evidentiary rulings in ongoing litigation. See, e.g.,
Frost v. Perry, 161 F.R.D. 434, 440-41 (D. Nev. 1995);
Kronisch v. United States, No. 83-cv-2458, 1995 WL
303625, at *10-13 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 1995); Maxwell
v. First Nat’l Bank of Md., 143 F.R.D. 590, 599-600 (D.
Md. 1992); Foster v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 492, 49596 (1987); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 97
F.R.D. 427, 430-33 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Am. Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 157, 162 (1983).
3. Most dismissals rest on the plaintiff’s
inability to make out a prima facie
case or carry his burden.
After FISA’s enactment, courts found dismissal
appropriate in several state-secrets cases. In most
cases, the common link was that the plaintiff could not
make out a prima facie case or carry the burden of persuasion without the privileged information. In other
words, dismissal was a consequence of the evidentiary
rule, but not a substantive remedy.
In Bareford v. General Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d
1138, 1140 (5th Cir. 1992), for example, the Fifth Circuit upheld the dismissal of “a manufacturing and
design defect suit against the manufacturer of a military weapons system.” The plaintiffs alleged that a
Navy frigate’s defense systems failed to prevent the
death of crewmen from missiles fired by an Iraqi
fighter jet. Id. at 1140-42. Although the plaintiffs
“ha[d] succeeded in producing considerable evidence,”
the court reasoned, they could “not establish a prima
facie case” without privileged “proof of what the Phalanx system was intended to do and the ways in which
it fails to accomplish these goals.” Id. at 1142. Bareford followed the Second Circuit’s parallel decision on
“almost identical … claims,” id., in Zuckerbraun v.
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General Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 547-48 (2d Cir.
1991), where there was likewise “no evidence available to the appellant to establish a prima facie case.”
See also 755 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (D. Conn. 1990) (decision below); Nejad v. United States, 724
F. Supp. 753, 754, 756 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (similar).
Other decisions fall into this category too. In Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 996-99 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a suit where
the plaintiffs could not establish standing without
privileged information about whether the NSA had intercepted their communications. See also AlHaramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d
1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007) (similar). In Sealed Case,
the court affirmed dismissal of a Fourth Amendment
claim against one of the defendants because the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case without
privileged information. 494 F.3d at 147. And in Black
v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir. 1995),
aff’g 900 F. Supp. 1129, 1135-37 (D. Minn. 1994), the
Eighth Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal of
FTCA and Bivens claims for inability to establish a
prima facie case without privileged information. See
also, e.g., Frost v. Perry, 919 F. Supp. 1459, 1468 (D.
Nev. 1996); Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 833
F. Supp. 1486, 1496 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
These decisions acknowledge that “the state secrets privilege is only an evidentiary privilege.” Spock,
464 F. Supp. at 519. Thus, although it “will often impose a grievous hardship, for it may deprive parties to
civil actions, or even to criminal prosecutions of power
to assert their rights or to defend themselves”—“a consequence of any evidentiary privilege”—that does not
mean a court should “allow [a party] to fill a gap in his
own evidence by recourse to what he suppresses.”
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United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638 (2d Cir.
1950) (Learned Hand, J.) (dictum).
Courts sometimes use broad language suggesting
that the state-secrets privilege bars an action. But in
many instances such formulations are imprecise or
unnecessary because the plaintiffs simply cannot
prove their case without the privileged information. In
El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir.
2007), for instance, the court stated that the suit
should be dismissed due to “the centrality of state secrets.” But that decision rested first and foremost on
the unremarkable proposition that the plaintiff could
not establish a prima facie case using only “admissible
evidence.” Id. at 309; see also Sterling v. Tenet, 416
F.3d 338, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2005) (“There is no way for
Sterling to prove employment discrimination without
exposing at least some classified details of the covert
employment that gives context to his claim…. Sterling’s retaliation claims similarly depend on proof of
facts that are state secrets.”).
As the D.C. Circuit has observed, that rule may
apply even where the plaintiff possesses sufficient material to prove an affirmative case. “[W]here a plaintiff
has proof of a defendant’s liability that is inaccessible
because of privilege, the courts are powerless to afford
a remedy.” Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 150; see also Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 65 & n.59 (discussing Farnsworth
Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 281 (4th Cir.
1980) (en banc) (per curiam)). Such was the case in
Farnsworth Cannon, a brief en banc opinion affirming
the “dismissal of the complaint upon a finding that the
plaintiff could not make out a prima facie case of tortious interference [with a contract] without resort to
the information within the excluded state secrets.”
635 F.2d at 281. (Thus, although the opinion contains
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vague, broad language about how “an attempt to make
out a prima facie case during an actual trial” would
“inevitably” threaten “disclosure of state secrets,” id.,
courts have understood Farnsworth Cannon to stand
for the uncontroversial proposition that dismissal was
warranted because the “plaintiff could not make out
[a] prima facie case of tortious interference with contract without resort to privileged information.” In re
United States, 872 F.2d 472, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1989); accord Zuckerbraun, 935 F.2d at 547.)
4. Other decisions finding dismissal
warranted rest on in camera review
of privileged information to ascertain
whether the government’s defense is
meritorious.
Courts have sometimes found dismissal appropriate even where the plaintiff could make out a prima
facie case. In such instances, however, courts sometimes rely not on the mere invocation of state-secrets
privilege, but instead on independent review of privileged materials, to find a meritorious defense.
The leading decision is Molerio, 749 F.2d 815.
There, in an opinion by then-Judge Scalia, the D.C.
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Daniel Molerio’s
First Amendment claim only after reviewing privileged materials in camera to independently determine
the real reason the FBI had failed to hire Molerio. Id.
at 825. Molerio had sued the FBI for failing to hire him
despite ranking him an “outstanding candidate.” Id.
at 819. The Bureau did not tell Molerio the reason for
its decision but intimated that a background investigation had revealed “something in New York having
to do with [Molerio’s] father,” who was believed to
have been a member of a Cuban political organization.
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Id. After upholding the government’s invocation of
privilege, the court was forced to address “the difficult
issue of the [privilege’s] effect.” Id. at 822, 824.
The difficulty was that, even without the privileged materials, Molerio had made out a prima facie
“circumstantial case permitting the inference that his
father’s political activities” were a motivating factor
for the failure to hire, in violation of the First Amendment. Id. at 824-25. The court nonetheless affirmed
summary judgment in the defendants’ favor. After “independently” examining an “in camera affidavit” (but
noting that an affidavit may not “always be sufficient
to determine the validity” of a state-secrets privilege
claim), id. at 822 & n.2, the court explained that it was
satisfied the “affidavit set forth the genuine reason for
denial of employment,” id. at 825. Because “the court
[knew] that the reason Daniel Molerio was not hired
had nothing to do with [his father’s] assertion of First
Amendment rights,” it could not risk permitting a jury
to reach that “erroneous conclusion.” Id.
Molerio represents a line of precedent holding that
“when the district court can determine that the defendant will be deprived of a valid defense based on
the privileged materials, it may properly dismiss the
complaint.” Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 149. A “valid defense” means a defense that “is meritorious and not
merely plausible and would require judgment for the
defendant.” Id.; see id. (citing Kasza v. Browner, 133
F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998), and Tenenbaum v. Simonini, 372 F.3d 776, 777-78 (6th Cir. 2004), as
adopting the “valid defense” standard). Determining
whether “the defendant will be deprived of a valid defense based on … privileged materials” requires
“appropriately tailored in camera review of the privileged record.” Id. at 149, 151; see also Kasza, 133 F.3d
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at 1165, 1169-70 (reviewing classified materials in
camera to affirm summary judgment); Tenenbaum,
372 F.3d at 777 (affirming summary judgment after
“review[ing] the materials Defendants produced under seal”). Without that judicial check, the D.C.
Circuit has cautioned, “virtually every case in which
the United States successfully invokes the state secrets privilege would need to be dismissed,” trading
“the practice of deciding cases on the basis of evidence”
for “a system of conjecture.” Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at
150. Adopting a presumption based on an evidentiary
privilege “would invariably shift the burdens of proof,”
contrary to Congress’ command that evidentiary rules
“cannot modify litigants’ substantive rights.” Id. at
143, 150 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)).
This approach need not burden courts much beyond Reynolds’ requirements for ensuring that claims
of privilege are well-founded in the first place. They
must be evaluated to determine “whether each challenged document’s disclosure would threaten national
security,” often requiring “examin[ation of] the privileged materials in camera.” Linder v. Dep’t of Def., 133
F.3d 17, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Ellsberg, 709 F.2d
at 63-64). In Freedom of Information Act cases, by
comparison, courts often review sensitive materials in
camera, even when those materials implicate national
security, to determine whether those materials
properly are being withheld. See, e.g., ACLU v. DOJ,
90 F. Supp. 3d 201 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Elec. Frontier
Found. v. DOJ, 57 F. Supp. 3d 54 (D.D.C. 2014); Elec.
Frontier Found. v. DOJ, No. 11-cv-05221, 2014 WL
3945646 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2014); ACLU v. Office of
the Director of Nat’l Intelligence, No. 10-cv-4419, 2011
WL 5563520 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2011). The result is
often to narrow the scope of what remains classified.
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See, e.g., Elec. Frontier Found., 57 F. Supp. 3d at 59;
Elec. Frontier Found., 2014 WL 3945646 at *2.
5. Courts have sometimes dismissed
cases based on the state-secrets
privilege, but only after recognizing
the severity of that result and
searching for alternatives.
In rare cases of recent vintage, but most often before General Dynamics, courts have dismissed cases
on the narrow but imprecise ground that “litigating
the case to a judgment on the merits would present an
unacceptable risk of disclosing state secrets.” Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070,
1083 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). When taking that
“drastic” action, courts “emphasize that it should be a
rare case when the state secrets doctrine leads to dismissal at the outset of a case” given “the impact on
human rights” and “the importance of constitutional
protections.” Id. at 1089, 1092.
In its 6–5 en banc decision in Mohamed, the Ninth
Circuit dismissed a complaint against Jeppesen Dataplan, a corporation that allegedly played a role in
plaintiffs’ extraordinary rendition and torture. See id.
at 1073-75. The court stated that it was “precluded
from explaining precisely which matters the privilege
covers lest [it] jeopardize the secrets [it was] bound to
protect,” but explained that it had “independently and
critically confirmed that their disclosure could be expected to cause significant harm to national security.”
Id. at 1086. “Because the facts underlying plaintiffs’
claims are so infused with these secrets,” the court
reasoned, “any plausible effort by Jeppesen to defend
against them would create an unjustifiable risk of revealing state secrets, even if plaintiffs could make a
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prima facie case on one or more claims with nonprivileged evidence.” Id. at 1088. The court found “precious
little Jeppesen could say about its relevant conduct
and knowledge without revealing information about
how the United States government does or does not
conduct covert operations.” Id. at 1089.
The Fourth Circuit has stated a similarly demanding test. In Fitzgerald v. Penthouse International,
Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1244 (4th Cir. 1985), the court
held that “[o]nly when no amount of effort and care on
the part of the court and the parties will safeguard
privileged material is dismissal warranted.” Scientist
James Fitzgerald claimed that Penthouse Magazine
libeled him by writing that he was trying to sell dolphin-based weapons systems abroad “to make some
fast bucks on the side by turning small countries into
‘instant naval powers.’” Id. at 1237. After learning
that Fitzgerald intended to call an expert to testify
about whether his dolphin research was classified, the
Navy intervened to assert the state-secrets privilege
over “the potential military uses of marine mammals.”
Id. at 1238, 1242-43. In the court’s view, the case fell
within a “narrow category” requiring dismissal “due
to the centrality of the privileged material to the very
question upon which a decision must be rendered.” Id.
at 1244. The court found no “less drastic options”
given its concern “with the parties’ ability to prove the
truth or falsity of the alleged libel without disclosing
state secrets.” Id. at 1243 & n.11. See also Bowles v.
United States, 950 F.2d 154, 155-56 (4th Cir. 1991)
(per curiam) (following Fitzgerald in affirming the
“drastic action” of dismissing FTCA claims); Abilt v.
CIA, 848 F.3d 305, 317 (4th Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal of disability-discrimination claims).
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The proposition in these decisions is that “dismissal is appropriate where further litigation would
present an unjustifiable risk of disclosure.” Abilt, 848
F.3d at 314. As a threshold matter, it is questionable
that courts must go so far, because those same courts
sometimes also note serious doubts about whether the
plaintiff “can make his prima facie case” in the first
place “without resort to privileged information.” Id. at
315-16; see Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1087 n.11 (“we are
not so sure” plaintiffs can “establish a prima facie
case”); cf. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 309.
It is unclear, moreover, how much these decisions
rely on the erroneous notion that “the Totten bar and
the Reynolds privilege form a ‘continuum of analysis.’”
Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1089. Under that approach, the
Totten rule “has evolved into the principle that where
the very subject matter of a lawsuit is a matter of state
secret, the action must be dismissed without reaching
the question of evidence.” Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at
1197. But that understanding predates this Court’s
guidance in General Dynamics that Reynolds and Totten represent distinct doctrines. 563 U.S. at 485-86.
“Reynolds was about the admission of evidence. It decided a purely evidentiary dispute by applying
evidentiary rules: The privileged information is excluded, and the trial goes on without it.” Id. at 485.
Totten, in contrast, rested not on procedural evidentiary rules, but the courts’ “common-law authority to
fashion contractual remedies in Government-contracting disputes.” Id.; accord Tenet, 544 U.S. at 3
(Totten “prohibit[s] suits against the Government
based on covert espionage agreements”).
*

*

*
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Courts’ care with the state-secrets privilege reflects their critical constitutional role in deciding
cases and controversies, particularly in the context of
potential Article II violations of individual rights. As
one court explained, “allowing the mere prospect of a
privileged defense to thwart a citizen’s efforts to vindicate his or her constitutional rights would run afoul
of th[is] Court’s caution against precluding review of
constitutional claims.” Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 151.
In short, “the abrogation of the plaintiff’s right of access to the courts would undermine our country’s
historic commitment to the rule of law.” Spock, 464
F. Supp. at 520.
CONCLUSION
The Court should consider the historical development and role of the state-secrets privilege in reaching
its decision.
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